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Effects of September I I Events 
ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OFSEPTEMBER 11 EVENTS ON FLIGHT TRAINING 
Atef Ghobrial and Gregory Streib 
Abstract 
I 
On September 1 1, 2001 the U.S. and the World witnessed the atrocities that terrorists inflicted. These tragic 
events have changed the approach for aviation security planning, management and policy. This paper attempted to 
address the effects of September 1 1 on the flight training business. We designed a questionnaire and surveyed 12 
flight training schools in Metro Atlanta. Analysis of the data was conducted using simple statistical correlations and 
cross tabulation. The results of the analysis are discussed in the body of the paper, and limitations of the study are also 
addressed. 
INTRODUCTION 
Aviation security has been on the government's 
agenda over the past thirty years in a cycle that overlays 
terrorist incidents involving airliners. Although the aviation 
community witnessed its first hijacking attempt in 193 1, it 
was not until the late 1960's that terrorist hijackings and 
sabotage of commercial airlines took a sharp increase. The 
majority of hijackings and sabotages towards the end of the 
past century were aimed at Western governments. Terrorists 
repeatedly took advantage of the West's neglect to bring 
about major aviation security reform. Commercial aviation 
became a favored target of terrorists because airlines 
represent a nationally-labeled container of hostages in the 
case of hijackings, or victims in the case of sabotage. For 
years, an inefficient system of aviation security has given 
terrorists an instrument to force not only political changes to 
influence the West's foreign policy, but also national 
turmoil and disruptions for whatever nation they prey on. 
Inadequate practices and procedures have been 
repeatedly documented and reported revealing 
vulnerabilities in the U.S. aviation security system well 
before the events of September 11, 2001 (GAO, May 25, 
2000 & June 28,2000). The commercial aviation industry 
lacked a uniform system of security procedures. Airlines 
have operated in an extremely volatile, cost sensitive 
environment, especially following deregulation in 1978. The 
responsibility of providing security screeners had been 
placed in the hands of air caniers until the recent changes to 
federalize screeners. 
On September 11,200 1 the United States and the 
world witnessed the atrocities that terrorists inflicted. 
Commercial airliners were hijacked and utilized as weapons 
when the two World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon 
were attacked causing deaths and destructions that will 
always be remembered. The Federal Aviation 
Administration's immediate response was to shut down the 
nation's airway system including airports. Not only were 
commercial air carriers grounded, but general aviation flying 
was also stopped. The FAA's crackdown on the nation's 
small aircraft industry lasted for nearly two weeks. With the 
banning of all Visual Flight Rules (VFR) flights during 
these two weeks, flight training schools across the U.S. were 
unable to operate their businesses. It is estimated that the 
nation's 2400 flight schools lost up to $15 million a day 
while VFR flights were banned, (The Business Review, 
200 1). 
Preliminary investigations following the events of 
September 11 showed that several of the hijackers had 
received flight training in the U.S., which raised concerns 
about security checks of individuals in flight training 
programs. It was later known that a number of hijackers 
were on the watch list of the Department of Justice, 
however, they were able to travel undetected through the 
nation's airways on commercial airliners and through airport 
security kilities. 
On November 19, 200 1, the President signed the 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act, creating the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) as an agency 
of the Department of Transportation. Under the Aviation 
and Transportation Security Act, flight schools and training 
Page 3 1 JAAER, Spriog 2005 
1
Ghobrial and Streib: Assessing the Effects of September 11 Events on Flight Training
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2005
Efects of September I I Events 
centers received requirements 6om the FAA to advise the 
Attorney General of any foreign applicants for flight 
instruction and to provide specific information on them. The 
Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
and the former Immigration and Naturalization Service 
developed the process and the details on the information to 
be provided. Flight schools, training centers, and flight 
instructors were advised of these procedures (AOPA-online, 
December 26,200 1). 
On January 5, 2002, a 15-year old student pilot 
took an aircraft without authorization from the flight school 
where he had been receiving flying lessons. The student 
pilot took off without clearance, b-aversed military airspace 
without permission, and crashed into a 42-story building in 
downtown Tampa, Florida. There 'was damage to the 
building, but no one inside the building or on the ground 
was injured by the crash itself or by falling debris. There 
was no fue, and the student was the only fatality. In view of 
that incident, the FAA, on January 9,2002, suggested some 
measures for enhanced security for flight schools and fixed 
base operators (CNN-online, January 10, 2002). The 
suggestions dealt primarily with limiting access to aircraft, 
and keeping it from unauthorized use when it is unattended. 
Another important issue as related to flying a light 
aircraft was the use of a drone aircraft as a biological or 
chemical weapon. These are pilotless and very small planes 
that come in a variety of sizes, shapes and capabilities. They 
can be equipped with spraying and aerosol-type capabilities. 
With today's Global Position Systems, GPS, and availability 
of maps, these planes can be purchased, used, guided and 
directed with great precision and capable of dispensing 
chemical and biological weapons. The concerns about 
drone aircraft were raised in February, 2003 before the war 
in Iraq. Arguments were also made that these small planes 
can be brought to the U.S. in small pieces and then be 
assembled and used against specific targets in the U.S. 
(CNN-online, February 25,2003). 
It should be noted that security of general aviation 
is of a national interest. In 2003, the TSA chartered a 
working group on general aviation within the existing 
Aviation Security Advisory Committee, (GAO, September 
9, 2003). The working group consists of industry 
stakeholders and is designed to identi@ and recommend 
actions to close potential security gaps in general aviation. 
On October 1,2003, the working group issued a report that 
included a number of recommendations for general aviation 
airport operators' voluntary use in evaluating airports' 
security requirements. These recommendations were both 
broad in scope and generic in their application, with the 
intent that every general aviation airport and landing facility 
Page 32 
operators may use them to evaluate that facility's physical 
security, procedures, infrastructure, and resources. TSA is 
taking some additional action to strengthen security at 
general aviation airports, including developing a risk-based 
self-assessment tool for general aviation to use in 
identieing security concerns (GAO, November 5,2003). 
By early 2005, TSA will issue "best practice" 
guidelines for security at more than 18,000 landing facilities 
nationwide that serve general aviation. TSA has also 
implemented the "twelve-five rule", which requires that 
operators using aircraft with a maximum certificated take- 
off weight of 12,500 pounds or more cany out a security 
program (DOT-gov). Additionally, the Aircraft Owners and 
Pilots Association (AOPA) has partnered with TSA to 
develop a nationwide Airport Watch Program that uses the 
more than 650,000 pilots as eyes and ears for observing and 
reporting suspicious activity. This helps general aviation 
keep airports secure without needless and expensive security 
requirements. AOPA Airport Watch is supported by a 
centralized government provided toll 6ee hotline, and 
system for reporting and acting on information provided by 
general aviation pilots. The Airport Watch Program includes 
warning signs for airports, informational literature, and 
training videotape to educate pilots and airport employees as 
to how security of their airports and aircraft can be 
enhanced, (AOPA - online). 
In early October 2004, the House Transportation 
and Infrastructure Committee approved a bill to enhance 
commercial aviation security. This bill, along with other 
security measures, is likely to be considered by the full 
House as part of legislation developed in response to the 
recommendations of the 9 1 1 Commission Report. Top 
officials in AOPA were able to convince legislators to 
exclude general aviation security from including in the bill. 
They explained the substantial improvements in general 
aviation security since September 1 1, 200 1. They also 
reviewed federal regulations to show that the safeguards in 
place governing flight over populated areas and near 
structures. General aviation pilots flying under Part 9 1 rules 
know who their passengers are and what's in their luggage 
- just like drivers of private passenger cars. Using a 
vehicle comparison chart, AOPA officials demonstrated the 
limited cargo capacity of a typical GA aircraft compared to 
the potential explosive loads of the cargo vans or semi 
trailer trucks that are ubiquitous in, for example, New York 
City, (AOPA on-line). 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the effects of 
the tragic events of September 1 1 on the business of flight 
training. The study was conducted by designing a 
questionnaire and interviewing managers and directors of 
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flight training schools at general aviation airports in Metro 
Atlanta, Georgia. The information was tabulated and 
analyzed statistically. The findings and limitations of the 
study are discussed in the paper. 
APPROACH 
Our approach to assess the impacts of September 
1 used interviews. We chose to design a questionnaire and 
interview managers and directors of a few flight schools in 
Metropolitan Atlanta. A copy of the questionnaire is at the 
end of the paper. The questionnaire consists mainly of four 
parts. Part I gathers information about individual flight 
school which includes certification types; cpmposition of 
fleet; customer breakdown in terms of those seeking careers 
in aviation, business flying, or leisure flying; and association 
of flight instructors with the school - that is part-time or 
full-time employees. Part I1 of the questionnaire collects 
information which describes the flight school operations 
prior to the events of September 11. This information 
includes the flight school perception of business growth, and 
security precautions and procedures that were in place 
before September 1 1, 200 1. Part 111 gathers information 
about the changes that have taken place in terms of security 
measures since September 11. This information includes 
adoption of any new procedures as related to security checks 
of trainees, availability of guiding procedures from the FAA 
to flight schools, security training needs of flight training 
schools, best methods to train flight schools on implanting 
security measures, financial arrangements to implement 
security procedures, and the impact of the events of 
September 11 on the financial health of flight training. In 
Part IV, managers of flight training schools express their 
views on the outlook of the flight training business and 
identify some measures that ought to be implemented to 
revive their businesses. 
Security of general aviation is a national issue 
which is being addressed by the industry stakeholders. 
However, for the purpose of demonstration and 
manipulation of the data, we limited our analysis to thirteen 
(13) flight training schools in Metropolitan Atlanta. These 
schools were interviewed in the fall quarter of 2002 and are 
located at Dekalb-Peachtree Airport, Cobb County Airport- 
McCollum Field, Fulton County Airport-Brown Field, 
Peachtree City Airport-Falcon Field, Douglas Municipal 
Airport, Griffin-Spalding County Airport, Clayton County 
Airport - Tara Field, Gwinnett County Airport-Briscoe 
Field. Individual school names are not identified, in the 
paper to maintain their privacy. By limiting the scope of the 
study to these thirteen flight schools, we hoped to capture a 
group of homogenous flight schools in terms of operating 
environment, and the socio-economic characteristics of the 
users. A cursory examination of the responses showed that 
the responses from one of the thirteen training schools were 
completely inconsistent. The school was viewed as an 
outlier observation, and was dropped from the list of flight 
schools in the study. 
Flight schools under consideration were established 
between 1984 and 1998, with an average of a little over ten 
years in business. Seven schools have Part 61 Certification 
only, and four schools have Part 61 and Part 141 
Certification. Table 1 depicts the breakdown of 
certifications and ratings offered by the schools. 
Table 1: A breakdown of Flight Schools by Certifications 
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All flight schools have single-engines; the number 
varies h r n  one to five planes with an average of about 2.5 
planes. As one would expect, the seven flight schools that 
offer multi-engine training would have multi-engine planes. 
Each of the seven schools has one multi-engine plane. 
The number of trainees in 2001 varies fkom 25 to 250. 
+ The correlation between the number of trainees in each 
school and the number of available planes is about 0.45. 
The weak correlation suggests that trainees select flight 
schools not only because of availably of planes but also 
because of other factors such as reputation of the school, its 
proximity to hornelwork, training fees, etc. It also suggests 
that utilization of planes varies ~~onsiderably among flight 
schools. Figure 1 depicts a breakdown of the percentage 01 
trainees in each school by purpose of training. Series 1 , 2  
and 3 represent the percentages of trainees seeking careers 
in aviation, business flying, and leisure flying; respectively. 
The Figure shows a wide variation in trainee mix among the 
different flight schools. On the average, half of the trainees 
are interested in leisure travel. Those interested in pursuing 
careers in aviation and those interested in business flying 
are, on the average, equal. Finally, five schools in the 
sample schools have fill-time flight instructors, four rely on 
part-time instructors, and three have a combination of full- 
time and part-time instructors. 
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A Growing Consensus about Security: 
The findings from the survey show that security measures 
were virtually non-existent prior to September 11. No 
background checks were conducted on applicants or 
employees. The respondents did not feel that checks were 
required by the FAA. Nor did they feel it was required to 
have procedures in place to conduct such checks. They 
indicated that they had never been contacted by the FAA (or 
any other agencies) about these matters. The respondents 
also indicated that there had been no security checking 
procedures for aircraft renters. The findings show a sea 
change, post September 11. Most of the respondents 
reported that background checks are now in place for 
American students, international students, and renters. 
Eflects of September I I Events 
The Business Impact of September 11: 
Flight schools do not exist to provide security. Their 
main business is train student to fly. The events of 
September 1 1  could certainly be seen as having an impact 
on both their ability to do this job efficiently and on the 
demand for flight training. By all outward appearances, 
flight training would appear to be a bushes that is under a 
great deal of strain. Much is written about the financial 
status of major airline carriers, but little is said about the 
prospects for flight training. Our survey explored this issue 
through four questions, asking respondents to rate the 
outlook for the flight training business in general, before and 
after September I I, and for the respondents own flight 
school, before and after September 11. 
Table 2: Respondent's Views of Flight Training Business Before 
and After September 11 
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As shown in Table 2, the views about the flight training Security Burdens and Flight Schools, Post September 11: 
business are mixed, though they are certainly not overly 
negative. Nor is there clear evidence that the outlook for the 
flight school business changed dramatically as a result of 
September 1 1. Looking at the extreme upper left cell, we 
see that one flight school respondent saw significant growth, 
both before and after September 1 1. Also, in the upper left 
are respondents fiom 6 other schools who see moderate 
growth. Two of these respondents predicted significant 
growth prior to September 11 and shifted downward to 
moderate growth for their post September I 1 rating. The 4 
respondents predicting moderate growth gave the same 
ratings for before and after September 1 1. 
Among those respondents holding more negative views, 
the Table also shows three respondents who predicted 
moderate growth prior to September 11 that shifted to a 
rating of slow growth, one who predicted slow growth 
before and after, and one who predicted stagnant growth 
prior to September 1 1 and slow growth afterwards. 
Coping with Insurance cost: 
Spiraling insurance costs are one of the greatest threats 
to the flight school business. The news here is mixed, but 
generally positive. Fifty-eight percent of the respondents 
indicated that their insurance premiums had stayed the same, 
post 9-1 1. The increases (at those schools that had them) 
ranged from 18 to 100 percent. The average increase was 
49 percent. Only one respondent reported an increase of 
100 percent, but this is certainly a stunning increase. 
Seventy-five percent of the respondents indicated that they 
were aware of flight schools that went banlaupt due to 
"unanticipated increases in insurance premiums." 
From the findings present above, we see that security 
checks are now a fact of life for flight schools--at least most 
of them. This raises many questions about the 
implementation of the new security procedures. Flight 
schools are now in the security business, to some extent or 
another, in the post September 1 1 world. 
One key question involves the role of the FAA in 
security checks. Analysis of the surveys showed no 
evidence that the FAA or the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
is involved in security checking. The respondents did not 
have any information on conducting security checks fiom 
federal agencies, and no training had been provided. In 
contrast, 67 percent of our respondents indicated that these 
agencies should conduct the checks themselves. 
Of course, there is no reason to think that federal 
agencies will do checks for flight schools anytime soon. 
This is most likely to be mandated and possibly there will 
also be some sort oftraining to help ensure the effectiveness 
of the process. Our respondents were asked about a number 
of possible training methods, and the findings are presented 
in Figure 2. A clear preference is evident, for live seminars 
or videos over computer-based training or manuals. 
If training on security checking was to be conducted, 
our respondents were not very interested in assuming the 
cost. All of our respondents indicated that individual flight 
schools should not be required to pay for training, and 75 
percent felt that the FAA should cover the cost. Indeed, our 
respondents did not feel that they should pay the costs of 
any aspects of background checking. Ninety-two percent 
indicated that the FAA should pay the costs for security 
checking and all of the respondents agreed that the flight 
school industry should not be responsible for these costs. 
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Figure 2: Respondent Preferences for FAA 
Security Training 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
OF STUDY: 
The tragic events of September 1 1,2001 have changed 
the approach to aviation security planning, management and 
policy. This paper attempted to investigate the effects of 
September 11 on the flight training business. Data were 
obtained 6om surveying 12 flight training schools in Metro 
Atlanta. Major findings in our study include: a) security 
measures were virtually non-existent prior to September 1 1 ; 
b) background checks is now required on applicants seeking 
flight training; c) there is not strong statistical evidence that 
the outlook for the flight training business changed 
dramatically as a result of September 11 events; d) a 
significant number of respondents indicated that they were 
aware of flight school that went banlaupt due to 
unanticipated increases in insurance premiums; and e) as 
one would expect, flight schools are not interested in 
assuming the cost of conducting security training or 
JAAER, Spring 2005 
checking. 
There are some limitatibns to our study. Although 
security of general aviation is a national issue, the study was 
conducted using a limited number of flight schools in 
Metropolitan Atlanta. Thirteen flight schools were 
interviewed and one had inconsistent results and was 
dropped fiom the analysis. There were variations among 
flight schools in terms of certification, number and types of 
planes, mix of hainees by purpose, etc. Flight schools were, 
however, selected ftom airports in Metro Atlanta. One may 
suggest that the results of the study are thus confined to that 
geographical area. It can also be suggested that future 
studies would consider a much broader cross-sectional data 
6om flight schools located in different parts of the U.S.; 
thus capturing variations in the operating environments of 
flight schools and in the socio-economic characteristics of 
the users. .) 
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Questionnaire 
Assessing the Effects of the September 11 Events 
on General Aviation Airports 
GENERAL 
1. Ownership of the airport: 
State County City Private 









3. What is the breakdown in aircraft operations in percentages (roughly): 
Local Operations: % 
Itinerant Operations: % 
Others: YO 
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4. Does the airport have a control tower? 
Yes No 
If YES, what are the hours of operations? 
How many runways and their lengths that your airport has? 
Is' runway Length: 
2nd runway Length: 
3rd runway Length: 





7. Who are the users at your airport? 
Flight Schools 
Corporate Operators 
Private1 Leisure (Individuals) 
JAAER, Spring 2005 Page 4 1 
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Commercial Operators (Charters) 
Industrial Use (Leasing space in the airport vicinity) 
II. PRESe~tember 11.2001 












Did the FAA or any other agencies ever inquire whether YOUR Aimort had a procedure in place to conduct a 
background check? 
Yes No 
Was background checking on the employees of airports required by the FAA or any other agencies? 
Yes No 
Were there any procedures set forth by the FAA or any other agencies for security and background checking on 
airport employees or airport users? 
Yes No 
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Was identification required by each of the following group while on the airport premises? 
Airport Employees Yes No 
Tenants of the Airport Yes No 
Users of the Airport Yes No 
7. Was there any communication between the airport management and the tenants on security 
issues? 
Yes No 
1. Are there any information or ~ro~edures currently available from the FAA or other agencies on guiding 
General Aviation Airports to perform security checks? 
Yes No 
2. Should security checks be conducted by individual General Aviation Airports or managed by the FAA-that 
is the FAAlDOJ conduct security checks on airport employees and tenants? 
Conducted by individual Airports Conducted by the FAAIDOJ 
3. Is there any coordination between the management of your airport and the tenantslusers at your airport in 
terms of "securityn? 
Yes No 
4. Do you see the need for the FAA to provide "securitv training" to Airports? 
Yes 0 No 
5. Do you see the need for certification of airports by the FAA based on "participation in a security training 
programw-that is an airport is certified if it participates in an approved security training program? 
Yes No 




Computer Based Training (CBT) 
7. In your opinion, who should pay for the expenses of t m  general aviation airports on security matters? 
FAA 
Individual Airport 
The tenants through increased fees 
4. In your opinion, who should pay for the expenses of conductina "security checks"? 
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FAA 
Individual airport from operating income 
The tenants through increased fees 
5. Following the events of 911 1, "insurance premiums" for YOUR airport: 
Stayed the same 
Increased by % (roughly) 
6. Are you aware of any tenants that went bankrupt due to "unanticipated increases in their insurance 
premiums"? 
Yes 0 No, If your answer is yes, how many tenants (roughly)? - 
IV. OUTLOOK FOR GENERAL AVIATION 












3. What changes do you think ought to be made in order to revive the general aviation industry? 
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